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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
BALANCE: PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING
INDUSTRIAL DESIGN PROTECTION IN THE
POST-TRIPS ERA
Every single thing made by man or woman
since the beginning of time has been designed.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial design is the ornamental or aesthetic design of prod-
ucts that are useful for the consumer or manufacturer,2 such as a
chair,3 a teapot,4 or even an electric razor.5 While designers during
the Industrial Revolution intended primarily to enhance the perform-
ance of machinery,6 the modem industrial designer is more con-
cemed with marketing and expressing an image that attracts consum-
ers.7 The advent of new materials and technologies in current society
provides industrial designers with more flexibility than ever to create
appealing styles for products.
8
1. Sir Terence Conran, Industrial Design from 1851 into the 21st Century,
in INDUSTRIAL DESIGN: REFLECTION OF A CENTURY 8, 8 (Jocelyn de Noblet
ed., 1993) [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL DESIGN].
2. See MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 16 (1996).
3. See Jocelyn de Noblet & Eric Mezil, The Feltri Armchair, in
INDUSTRIAL DESIGN, supra note 1, at 267, 267.
4. See Eric Mezil, Alessi, in INDUSTRIAL DESIGN, supra note 1, at 265,
265.
5. See Eric Mezil, The Razor, in INDUSTRIAL DESIGN, supra note 1, at
240, 240.
6. See Jocelyn de Noblet, Design in Progress, in INDUSTRIAL DESIGN, su-
pra note 1, at 21, 21-22.
7. See Marion Hancock, Industrial Design Today, in INDUSTRIAL DESIGN,
supra note 1, at 268, 272.
8. See de Noblet, supra note 6, at 25.
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With the increasing expressivity in industrial design has come
an increasing need for protection against rote copying, which dilutes
the return on investment for designers. 9 Intellectual property laws
are the traditional way society provides such protection, thereby en-
couraging innovation. 10 Intellectual property is principally consid-
ered to consist of three I general areas of law: patent, 1 copyright,' 3
and trademark.' 4 This Comment discusses the fourth area of the in-
tellectual property "trilogy," the area of industrial design protection.
Industrial designs consist of articles that are both useful to soci-
ety and have artistic value, 15 much like works of architecture. 16 The
9. See id. at 25-26.
10. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright
Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2432,2434 (1994).
11. See, e.g., Steven A. Church, Note, The Weakening of the Presumption
of Validity for Design Patents: Continued Confusion Under the Functionality
and Matter of Concern Doctrines, 30 IND. L. REv. 499, 502 n.14 (1997).
Church actually finds four areas of law, since he considers trade dress law
separate from trademark law. See id. However, both trade dress and trade-
mark are protected by the Lanham Act. See infra Part V.B.
12. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994). A patent is granted to one who invents
something new, useful, and nonobvious. See id. §§ 101-103. In addition to
processes, methods, machines, manufacture, and compositions of matter, pat-
ents can also be granted for designs. See id. § 171.
13. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994). The copyright laws constitutionally
apply to authors. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have
Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries .... ."). Despite this language, the types of works
protected by copyright include pictorial or graphic works (art), and sculptural
works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). Included in the category of "pictorial, graphic
and sculptural works" are useful articles that have artistic features. See id.
§ 101.
14. The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994), is the federal act that
codified "trademark law." While a trademark is traditionally considered a
name or phrase designating the origin of a company or product, Lanham Act
protection is more expansive than common law trademark protection. In addi-
tion, the Lanham Act also covers subject matter such as unfair competition
through false designation of origin or false description. See id. § 1125(a).
15. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
16. Congress, in recognizing the dual nature of architecture, quoted archi-
tecture critic Ada Louise Huxtable when considering improved intellectual
property protection for architectural works. Congress found that "[tihe key to
the art of architecture is the conviction and sensitivity with which technology
and function are interpreted aesthetically, in solutions of a practical social pur-
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Industrial Designers Society of America defines industrial design as
"[t]he professional service of creating and developing concepts and
specifications that optimize the function, value, and appearance of
products and systems for the mutual benefit of the user and the
manufacturer."17
Industrial design is an area of intellectual property protected un-
der the recently-signed Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). 18 TRIPs provides its signatory
countries with minimum standards for protecting intellectual prop-
erty rights and limitations on those rights. 19 In enacting legislation
implementing TRIPs in the United States, President Clinton stated
that existing intellectual property laws sufficiently protect industrial
design.2 °
Contrary to President Clinton's contention, none of the major
bodies of intellectual property law currently provide adequate pro-
tection for industrial designs. Design patent protection fails to pro-
tect these goods, for if the goods survive all of the patent law re-
quirements and the patent finally issues, protection will often be too
late to be effective for industrial design, due to its short product life-
cycle.2 ' Trademark and unfair competition laws might provide pro-
tection for the "trade dress" of a product,22 but courts are becoming
pose." H.R. REP. No. 101-735, at 18 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6935, 6949.
17. Cooper C. Woodring, A Designer's View on the Scope of Intellectual
Property Protection, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 309, 309 (1996) (quotation omitted).
18. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-REsULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994), arts. 25-26, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1207 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPs]. TRIPs was adopted in conjunction with the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, which also contained thirteen other
agreements relating to multilateral trade. See BLAKENEY, supra note 2, at 7-8.
19. See Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the
TRIPs Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 357, 360 (1998).
20. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part V.A.
22. Trademarks refer to situations where the product's identifier is a word
or a logo; trade dress refers to a product's packaging or its own design. See
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of
Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REV. 471, 477 (1997). Trade dress is
protected by section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). See Din-
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increasingly hostile towards the use of the these laws to protect
industrial design.23 Copyright law, therefore, would be the best place
to protect this artistry, but copyright law too is currently deficient in
offering predictable protection.
24
In fact, none of these laws provide consistent protection for in-
dustrial designs. Industrial designers are currently faced with an in-
tellectual property void: no matter where they turn-whether it is to
copyright, trade dress, or design patent law-their work remains ex-
tremely difficult to protect.
There is a perception that copyright laws protect industrial de-
sign; however, the protection comes with a "catch." That catch is the
requirement of conceptual separability.25 Because copyright law
protects only the aesthetic and creative expression of authors, the
protected features of design-the parts that would be created by an
artist or author-must be physically or conceptually separable from
the product's functional features. 26 This conceptual separability re-
quirement has degenerated into a multitude of inconsistent tests that
provide only limited and inadequate protection for industrial de-
sign.
27
When Congress recognized that conceptual separability was dis-
astrous for protecting architecture, it removed the conceptual separa-
bility requirement for architecture by modifying the copyright laws,
making architecture protection easier.2 8 While the substantive nature
of this new architecture copyright protection has not been exten-
sively tested in the courts, its policies, such as protecting the aes-
thetic features of original architecture, are consistent with the poli-
cies underlying industrial design protection.29 Given these similar
policies, one proposal to improve industrial design intellectual prop-
erty laws is to expand the newly enacted architectural copyright laws
to include industrial design protection.30
woodie, 75 N.C. L. REV. at 475-76 & n.14.
23. See infra Part V.B.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part IV.B.
28. See infra Part VI.
29. See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Part VII.A.
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Before considering such a proposal, however, one should first
consider the need for a balanced approach in drafting intellectual
property law. A desired balance weighs access to prior works
against protection for new works as an incentive for their creation.
No matter what approach lawmakers take to improve industrial de-
sign protection, the desired balance should always be kept in mind.3 '
Otherwise, the proposal to expand architecture copyright law to in-
clude industrial design will encounter problems because the monop-
oly power inherent in the copyright laws32 could outweigh the bene-
fits to designers.
Congress may need to look to other solutions. Another proposal
might be to carve out a fourth area of intellectual property law spe-
cifically for design protection.33 This new design protection law
could be tailored to achieve the appropriate balance between stimu-
lation of new designs through increased protection and limitations to
check monopoly power. Whether the architecture copyright law is
expanded or a new design law is created, increasing industrial design
protection will benefit society by promoting creativity and innova-
tion in product design while preventing consumer confusion.
This Comment examines the failure of intellectual property
protection for industrial design and proposes solutions within and
outside of copyright law. Part II explores the TRIPs Agreement, and
its underlying goal of protecting all forms of intellectual property,
including industrial design, while maintaining the balance appropri-
ate to intellectual property laws. Part III examines the constitutional
and statutory background of copyright law and summarizes the at-
tempted solutions of the 1976 Copyright Act. Part IV addresses how
copyright law treats industrial design, which it calls "useful articles,"
focusing on the various conflicting tests for conceptual separability.
Part V surveys the alternative modes of protection, namely design
patent and trade dress, and concludes that these are insufficient due
to the uncertainty of design patent enforcement and the hostility
31. The exact wording of laws necessary to achieve this balance is beyond
the scope of this article. However, TRIPs appears to keep the balance in mind.
See infra Part II.
32. See infra note 277 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part VII.B.
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toward product configuration trade dress.34 Part VI examines the
copyright protection for architecture, discussing the motivations of
Congress and the policies surrounding this new law. Part VII dis-
cusses alternative methods of protecting industrial design, expanding
architecture copyright law and creating new sui generis35 protection.
Finally, this Comment concludes that whether Congress chooses to
borrow from the architectural copyright standards or create a fourth
area of design protection, society will benefit from increased indus-
trial design protection.
II. INDUSTRIAL DESIGN IN THE TRIPs AGREEMENT
TRIPs is one subsection of GATT, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, adopted as part of the Uruguay Round of multilat-
eral trade negotiations after close to seven years of talks.36 TRIPs,
Annex 1C of GATT, consists of 73 articles which outline:
a detailed code of rules setting standards for the availability,
scope and use of intellectual property rights, including pat-
ents, copyright, the rights of performers and producers of
sound recordings, trademarks, geographical indications in-
cluding appellations of origin, industrial designs, layout de-
signs of integrated circuits, protection of trade secrets, and
control of anti-competitive practices in intellectual prop-
erty.
37
After minor technical revisions,38 TRIPs was signed in Mar-
rakesh, Morocco, on April 15, 1994.39 Over one hundred countries
signed the Final Act.4°
34. See infra note 190 and accompanying text (defining product configura-
tion trade dress).
35. Sui generis means "[o]f its own kind or class." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990).
36. See Amelia Porges, Introductory Note, in General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Uruguay Round): Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15,
1993, 33 I.L.M. 1, 1-2 (1994).
37. Id. at 4.
38. See Amelia Porges, Introductory Note, in General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1128 (1994).
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The TRIPs Agreement begins with a declaration of the purposes
of the new treaty.4' On one hand, the signatory countries recognized
the need for "effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of
trade-related intellectual property rights."42 On the other hand, the
members also recognized that they must "ensure that measures and
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves
become barriers to legitimate trade."' 3 TRIPs, therefore, strikes a
balance between the stimulation of intellectual property through
added protection and the necessary guarantee of a free market.
This balance is also evident within the TRIPs Industrial Design
provisions themselves. For example, TRIPs allows industrial de-
signers to "prevent third parties not having the owner's consent from
making, selling or importing articles bearing or embodying a design
which is a copy, or substantially a copy, of the protected design."
44
Such industrial design protection is clearly a broad new right for in-
tellectual property owners. TRIPs tempers this new right, however,
with limitations: a limited duration of ten years of protection,45 an
originality requirement,46 and an option that "[m]embers may pro-
vide that such protection shall not extend to designs dictated essen-
tially by technical or functional considerations., 47 Having limita-
tions such as these is key to achieving the appropriate balance
between protection and competition.
TRIPs also addressed implementation, providing that:
Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agree-
ment. Members may, but shall not be obliged to, imple-
ment in their law more extensive protection than is required
by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not
contravene the provisions of this Agreement. Members
shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
39. See id. at 1125.
40. See id. at 1131.
41. See TRIPs Prologue.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. art. 26, § 1.
45. See id. art. 26, § 3.
46. See id. art. 25, § 1.
47. Id.
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implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their
own legal system and practice.
4 8
In essence, TRIPs has integrated the intellectual property laws of
most major countries into a single international legal scheme.
The United States enacted changes to its intellectual property
laws to conform with TRIPs in a law passed on December 8, 1994.49
In presenting the TRIPs Agreement to Congress for consideration,
President Clinton submitted a Statement of Administrative Action,
50
which detailed how each article of TRIPs either was already ad-
dressed by existing law, or needed to be addressed by Congress.
51
The Statement of Administrative Action provided that TRIPs "will
also better protect . . . industrial designs." 52 But in determining
which changes were necessary to implement this improved protec-
tion in the United States, the Statement concluded that "[p]rotection
currently available under U.S. patent and copyright law meets the re-
quirements of these [TRIPs industrial design] articles." 53 Determin-
ing the accuracy of this conclusion requires a detailed examination of
existing United States intellectual property law, to see if each area of
law complies with TRIPs by protecting industrial design. Most of
the recent legislation involving industrial design has centered around
copyright law.54 Therefore, it is appropriate to examine this area of
the law first.
48. Id. art. 1, § 1.
49. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, tit. V, 108
Stat. 4809, 4973-90 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., and 35 U.S.C.).
50. The report was submitted on September 27, 1994. See Letter from
President William J. Clinton to the Congress of the United States (Sept. 27,
1994), in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING THE URUGUAY ROUND TABLE AGREEMENTS, TEXTS OF
AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 1-2 (1994) [hereinafter MESSAGE
TRANSMITTING URUGUAY ROUND TABLE AGREEMENTS].
51. See THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT: STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, reprinted in MESSAGE TRANSMITTING URUGUAY
ROUND TABLE AGREEMENTS, supra note 50, at 656 [hereinafter STATEMENT
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION].
52. Id. at 1154.
53. Id. at 985.
54. See infra Parts VI, VII.B.
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III. BACKGROUND-How COPYRIGHT CAME TO "PROTECT"
INDUSTRIAL DESIGN
A. The Early Years of Copyright Protection
Copyright protection traces its roots to when Queen Mary of
England granted protection to some of the first book printers in
1557.ss While early English copyright cases centered around book
publishing, maps and charts were also considered proper subjects of
copyright protection.
56
The United States of America provided constitutional protection
for copyright from its inception, 57 and enacted its first Copyright Act
in 1790 to protect books, maps, and charts. 58 This protection was
gradually expanded between 1802 and 1870 to include prints, musi-
cal compositions, photographs, and three-dimensional works of fine
art.59 The United States Supreme Court, in two separate cases, ex-
plained that the Constitution's inclusion of the terms "author" and
"writer" did not limit these words to their traditional definitions; thus
the Court gave photographers and engravers protection as well. 60 Of
particular interest was Justice Holmes' conclusion in Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co. that the use of a work of art for a
commercial purpose did not prevent copyright protection.6' This
conclusion was greatly significant because it permitted even the ear-
liest designers and artists to receive copyright protection for their
commercial artistic works.
55. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 3
(1967).
56. See id. at 16.
57. See supra note 13.
58. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802); Shira
Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful
Articles, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 339, 341 (1990).
59. See Sally M. Donahue, Comment, The Copyrightability of Useful Arti-
cles: The Second Circuit's Resistance to Conceptual Separability, 6 TOURO L.
REv. 327, 329 (1990).
60. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250-51
(1903); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884).
61. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251; Donahue, supra note 59, at 330.
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In reaction to these two cases, the drafters of the 1909 Copyright
Act afforded protection to all "works of art,"62 which the Court
interpreted to include the aesthetic elements of copyrighted design
works.63 This ruling opened the door to Copyright Office protection
for such diverse objects as "clocks, candlesticks, inkstands, door
knockers, ashtrays and salt shakers."
64
B. The Supreme Court Reaffirms Protection in Mazer v. Stein
In Mazer v. Stein, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of
whether a lamp manufacturer could copyright a base that doubled as
an artistic work, a statuette of a female dancer.65 The petitioner
urged the Court to limit copyright protection for useful articles in
light of available design patent protection. 66 The Court rejected this
argument, and distinguished between the separate purposes of copy-
right and patent laws:
Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that be-
cause a thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted. We
should not so hold.
Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to
the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression
of the idea-not the idea itself.
67
The Court found "nothing in the copyright statute to support the
argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible
for copyright bars or invalidates its registration." 68 Furthermore, the
Court failed to offer any guidance as to when elements of a useful
article are copyrightable.
69
62. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 5(g), 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (repealed
1976).
63. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 212-13 (1954) ("[I]t is clear Congress
intended the scope of the copyright statute to include more than the traditional
fine arts.").
64. Perlmutter, supra note 58, at 342 (citing Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219, 221
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
65. See 347 U.S. at 204-05.
66. See id. at 215.
67. Id. at 217 (citations omitted); see also Perlmutter, supra note 58, at 345
(discussing Mazer).
68. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218.
69. See Perlmutter, supra note 58, at 345; Donahue, supra note 59, at 332-
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C. The Copyright Act of 1976
After Mazer, the Copyright Office tinkered with its regulations
in an effort to satisfy the Supreme Court's grant of protection to use-
ful articles.70 After a few attempts, the 1960 version of the regula-
tion read as follows:
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the
fact that the article is unique and attractively shaped will not
qualify it as a work of art. However, if the shape of a utili-
tarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculp-
ture, carving, or pictorial representation, which can be
identified separately and are capable of existing independ-
ently as a work of art, such features will be eligible for reg-
istration.
71
By focusing on artistic features that can be identified separately, the
1960 regulation provided the first test that allowed protection for in-
dustrial design.
The 1976 Copyright Act incorporated the Copyright Office
regulation in its definition of "[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works."72 In adopting this test, the House Committee report noted
that "[u]nless the shape of... [the] industrial product contains some
element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separa-
ble from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be
copyrighted under the bill."73  Thus were born the dual tests of
physical separability and conceptual separability. Physical separa-
bility is somewhat easy for courts to understand-the functional part
of an object must be physically detachable from the artistic part.
74
33.
70. See Perlmutter, supra note 58, at 345-46.
71. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960); see also Perlmutter, supra note 58, at 346
(explaining history of regulation).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
73. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5668.
74. See, e.g., Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F.
Supp. 1378, 1392 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (finding the artistic labeling of a perfume
box physically separable from the utilitarian aspects of the perfume itself,
thereby avoiding a conceptual separability analysis); see also 1 PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 2.5.3, at 2:64 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing physical
separability of a miniature eagle sculpture welded to an outdoor lighting fix-
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Conceptual separability, on the other hand, is a more difficult idea
that has become the subject of much discussion.75
Before dissecting conceptual separability, however, it is impor-
tant to note that Congress did not stop at merely incorporating the
1960 Copyright Office regulations. Congress also changed the lan-
guage in 17 U.S.C. § 10176 by redefining which articles would
trigger application of the conceptual separability test. Whereas the
test previously applied only to works with a "solely utilitarian func-
tion," it now governs any design with "an intrinsic utilitarian func-
tion."77 This severely limits protection by subjecting "virtually all
'ornamental designs of useful articles' ... to the [conceptual] sepa-
rability test.
' 78
Determining what items are useful can be a difficult task for
district court judges. If the word "useful" is construed broadly,
stuffed animals and other toys might fail to receive copyright protec-
tion, as these items are useful as entertainment for small children.
79
Some judges that do follow a broad definition of "useful" find cos-
tumes and other works of fashion very difficult to protect under
copyright laws due to the utility of these garments in clothing the
body; once this utility conclusion is reached, a finding of conceil ual
separability is practically impossible.
8 0
ture; remove the useful lighting fixture and the eagle sculpture remains intact).
75. See, e.g., Edward A. Nolfi, Annotation, Copyrightability of Sculptural
Works, 83 A.L.R. FED. 845 (1987) (discussing cases that interpret the 1976 Act
and its conceptual separability requirement).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 101 is the section of the Copyright Act that provides gen-
eral definitions of terms used in the Act.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at
54-55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667-68 (proposing the
conceptual separability test).
78. Keith Aoki, Contradiction and Context in American Copyright Law, 9
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303, 324 (1991). To illustrate how restrictive this
change was, note that it would have denied copyright protection to one of the
most-discussed objects of industrial design ever copyrighted-the pencil
sharpener shaped like an antique telephone. See Ted Arnold, Ltd. v. Silver-
craft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (noting that, while the article
had a function, being a pencil sharpener was not its sole function).
79. But see Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir.
1983) (rejecting the contention that a toy airplane is "useful").
80. See, e.g., Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative
Group, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 319, 324 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affid in part, vacated in
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The reason Congress narrowed protection for useful articles per-
haps lies with the separate protection Congress planned to give
works of industrial design in Title II of the Copyright Act of 1976.8
Title II would have granted a shorter term of protection to industrial
design without other significant limitations.82 But Congress deleted
Title II, partially due to concerns that the law extended copyright
protection into areas that were not constitutionally permitted.83 The
Copyright Office itself opposed Title II, arguing to the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals that it feared creating a new mo-
nopoly for industrial design, despite the limited nature8 4 of the so-
called new monopoly.85 Congress dropped what appeared to be a vi-
able plan for protecting industrial design, instead leaving courts to
the confusing analysis of useful articles and conceptual separability.
part on other grounds, 122 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 1997) (refusing copyright pro-
tection for costumes of "Toucan Sam" and the "Pillsbury Doughboy"); S. Priya
Bharathi, Comment, There is More than One Way to Skin a Copycat: The
Emergence of Trade Dress to Combat Design Piracy of Fashion Works, 27
TEX. TECH L. REv. 1667, 1678 (1996) (discussing the failure of copyright
law's useful article doctrine to protect fashion works). To further illustrate the
difficulty courts have with conceptual separability and useful articles, compare
National Theme Productions, Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1348
(S.D. Cal. 1988), upholding copyright protection for costumes, with Whimsi-
cality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., 721 F. Supp. 1566, 1576 (E.D.N.Y. 1988),
affid in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989),
denying copyright protection for costumes virtually identical to those in Na-
tional Theme Productions.
81. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 94-1733, at 82 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5810, 5823.
82. Title II would have, in fact, granted ten years total protection, excluding
only "commonplace" shapes. See J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Do-
mestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the
Copyright Act of1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1252-55.
83. See Perlmutter, supra note 58, at 349 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at
50 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5663).
84. Title II design protection would have limited the term of copyright for
design works to ten years. See id. at 349 n.43.
85. See Esquire v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The court
upheld the rejection by the Copyright Office of a copyright application for ar-
tistically designed lamps. The head of the Copyright Office at that time, also
known as the Register of Copyrights, was Barbara Ringer. See id. at 806; see
also Aoki, supra note 78, at 325-29 (discussing the Esquire argument and de-
cision).
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IV. THE CONFUSION OF THE USEFUL ARTICLES AND CONCEPTUAL
SEPARABILITY TESTS
The industrial designer today, facing the daunting task of seek-
ing protection under copyright law, must convince a judge that either
the item to be protected is not useful or the useful part of the item is
separable from the artistic part. This Section explores the major tests
that have evolved in the utility and separability areas, arguing that
none of the tests provides a clear, predictable path for protection of
industrial design.
A. The Importance of the Useful Article Analysis
Non-useful articles are granted copyright protection as pictorial,
graphical, or sculptural works.8 6 If an article has "an intrinsic utili-
tarian function," however, it is a useful article which can only be
copyrighted if its artistic features are capable of being identified
separately from its useful features.8 7 While it appears that the best
way to avoid the conceptual separability problem is to argue against
the usefulness of an article, that argument may be difficult to accept
because practically everything is useful.88  One commentator has
pointed out that some subject matter is copyrightable despite the fact
that it is useful in some definition of the word: "Usefulness per se,
however, is not necessarily a bar to copyrightability. Computer pro-
grams are both useful and protected. Traditional art forms are also
useful; art and music therapy are not modem upstarts. Aristotle en-
couraged drama and music for their cathartic effects. The Stoics jus-
tified poetry by its moral effects." 89 In fact, this commentator even
noted, without elaboration, that Congress had already made an ex-
ception by providing iprotection for architectural works separate from
other useful articles.
90
86. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
87. Id.
88. Copyright law actually does limit what is considered to be useful-a
"useful article" is "an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information." Id.
89. Malla Pollack, Comment, Intellectual Property Protection for the
Creative Chef or How to Copyright a Cake: A Modest Proposal, 12 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1477, 1487-88 (1991).
90. See id. at 1488. Pollack proposed similar separate protection for "the
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Unfortunately, examination of case law dealing with useful arti-
cles does not reveal any consistency as to what constitutes "useful."
While some courts call costumes useful and deny copyright protec-
tion,91 the Third Circuit found that animal nose masks were not use-
ful because their use was to create humor, which was not a use en-
compassed within the statutory definition of 17 U.S.C. § 101.92
Other courts have held that a sculpture-like article, such as a manne-
quin, is not a useful article when its only use is to portray its appear-
ance.93 Some courts, however, have found mannequins to be useful
due to their function in displaying clothes.
94
In light of the ambiguity over the utility test, designers seeking
copyright protection should try to assert that their designs are not
useful articles, for that avoids the conceptual separability test.
Should the designer run into utility logic like that found in cases like
Carol Barnhart, however, there may still be a need to plead concep-
tual separability.
95
edible arts." Id. at 1486.
91. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
92. See Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., 912 F.2d 663, 670 (3d
Cir. 1990); see also Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 973 (6th
Cir. 1983) (holding that a toy airplane is not a useful article even though it is
used "to be played with and enjoyed").
93. See, e.g., Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply
Co., 74 F.3d 488, 494 (4th Cir. 1996) (analyzing deer mannequins and finding
them not useful).
94. See, e.g., Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411,
414 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that parties conceded that human mannequins were
useful). It is understandably easier to argue that mannequins or clothing would
be useful articles than it is to argue the same for toys or stuffed animals.
95. See, e.g., Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280,
1284-85 (10th Cir. 1996). The Tenth Circuit analyzed whether the toy dolls in
question were copyrightable, and quoted from 17 U.S.C. § 101, noting that the
first part of the statutory language does not give outright copyright protection
to works that have utilitarian functions. See id. at 1287. However, the court
applied the statute and improperly considered only the first clause of the
quoted sentence. The court failed to note the latter clause, which protects use-
ful articles if they contain artistic features that are physically or conceptually
separable. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. In fact, the court never discussed whether the
toy dolls in question were indeed useful. See Country Kids, 77 F.3d at 1287.
Not all courts make this mistake. In a recent case involving the design of
a ring, the district court judge performed the analysis correctly, declining a de-
fendant's invitation to analyze conceptual separability, in light of the fact that
the piece of jewelry in question was not a useful article. See Donald Bruce &
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B. The Many Tests of Conceptual Separability
In the seminal Supreme Court decision of Mazer v. Stein,96 the
Court could find "nothing in the copyright statute to support the ar-
gument that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible
for copyright bars or invalidates its registration." 97 Mazer should
have put to rest the argument about whether an item of industrial de-
sign can receive copyright protection. Yet, the debate over whether
industrial design was properly protected by copyright raged on for
years. Many courts followed Mazer and protected industrial de-
sign;98 still, some courts felt that industrial design copyright protec-
tion was impermissible.
99
Congress, in revising the Copyright statute, attempted to clear
up the confusion by noting that pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works that were also useful articles could be copyrighted as long as
the "design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that
can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing inde-
pendently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article." 100 The legislative
history of the 1976 Copyright Act "clarified" this section as requiring
separability, either "physically or conceptually."'
10
As a preliminary matter, there are very few cases involving
physical separability; 0 2 conceptual separability is where there is
much debate. But by setting forth a test such as conceptual separa-
bility without providing any guidance, Congress opened the flood
Co. v. B.H. Multi Com Corp., 964 F. Supp. 265, 267 (N.D. 111. 1997).
96. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
97. Id. at 218.
98. See, e.g., Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733, 736
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (finding separate consumer desires for artistic telephone and
utilitarian pencil sharpener and therefore finding copyrightability in light of
Mazer).
99. See, e.g., Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 800-01, 805 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (disparaging copyright of industrial design). Although Esquire was a
post-1976 Act case, it applied pre-1976 Act law. See id. at 799 n.8.
100. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
101. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5668.
102. But see Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F.
Supp. 1378, 1392 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (finding utilitarian box design physically
separable from aesthetic perfume).
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gates to a wide variety of interpretations. These judicial interpreta-
tions have led one commentator to declare that conceptual separabil-
ity is "an increasingly unintelligible body of law."10 3 An examina-
tion of five tests developed by various courts supports this opinion.
1. The Kieselstein-Cord "primary-subsidiary" test
The first major opinion to discuss conceptual separability origi-
nated in the Second Circuit in Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By
Pearl, Inc.10 4 Barry Kieselstein-Cord created artistic belt buckles
that won him many design awards; even the prestigious Metropolitan
Museum of Art accepted the buckles for its permanent collection.1
0 5
The defendant made unauthorized copies and urged the Second Cir-
cuit to invalidate the copyright. 0 6 Judge Oakes examined the statute,
legislative history, and various scholarly publications and concluded
that the buckle design passed the conceptual separability test because
"[t]he primary ornamental aspect of the.., buckles is conceptually
separable from their subsidiary utilitarian function."'
10 7
Many courts have attempted to follow the Kieselstein-Cord test
by considering the primary and subsidiary purposes of a piece of in-
dustrial design. However, these attempts have been inadequate be-
cause the courts have not specified exactly what is a primary or sub-
sidiary purpose. 10 8 In fact, courts and commentators have criticized
this test as being beyond anything found in the statute or legislative
history.' 0 9 For example, what if the ornamental and utilitarian
103. Aoki, supra note 78, at 383-84.
104. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
105. Seeid. at991.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 993.
108. See, e.g., Act Young Imports, Inc. v. B and E Sales Co., 673 F. Supp.
672, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Kieselstein-Cord to find backpacks shaped
like animals conceptually separable, but not analyzing primary-subsidiary as-
pects); Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, 95 F.R.D. 95, 98 (D.
Del. 1982) (finding Kieselstein-Cord "well-reasoned and persuasive" in hold-
ing eyeglass display case artistic design conceptually separable from utilitarian
function, without analyzing primary-subsidiary aspects).
109. See Perlmutter, supra note 58, at 359-60; see also Norris Indus. v. In-
temational Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 923-24 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (finding
the wavy pattern of a wire-spoked wheel cover to be primarily useful). Some
have criticized the application of the primary-subsidiary test in Norris Indus-
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aspects were equal? 110 While Judge Oakes proclaimed Kieselstein-
Cord to be "on a razor's edge of copyright law,""' Congress proba-
bly envisioned the conceptual separability test to be easier than the
primary-subsidiary test proposed by Judge Oakes.
2. The Carol Barnhart "inextricably intertwined" test
Five years after Kieselstein-Cord, the Second Circuit had an-
other opportunity to discuss conceptual separability in Carol Barn-
hart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.112 This case involved copied
mannequins of partial human torsos." 3 The Second Circuit, in a
two-to-one decision, denied copyright protection because the "aes-
thetic and artistic features of the Barnhart forms are inseparable from
the forms' use as utilitarian articles." 114 The court distinguished the
buckles of Kieselstein-Cord as having artistic design "wholly unnec-
essary to performance of the utilitarian function."" 5 The court com-
pared the buckles with the mannequin torsos and found the torsos'
artistic elements "inextricably intertwined" with the torsos' utilitar-
ian features, and therefore not copyrightable."16
The Carol Barnhart test borders on the ludicrous. As one critic
of the decision observed, "[a]ny artistic features that are... inextri-
cably intertwined with the object's utilitarian function will almost in-
evitably be physically inseparable." 117 This test makes conceptual
separability such a high hurdle for industrial design, that it would
protect very few, if any, works."i
8
tries as inconsistent with Supreme Court warnings that judges should not be
arbiters of artistic taste; these commentators felt that Norris Industries was be-
yond the scope of the Copyright Act. See Donahue, supra note 59, at 342
(citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903)
(Holmes, J.)).
110. See Perlmutter, supra note 58, at 359.
111. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 990.
112. 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
113. See id. at 412-13.
114. Id. at418.
115. Id. at 419.
116. Id.
117. Perlmutter, supra note 58, at 362.
118. See Aoki, supra note 78, at 340.
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3. The Judge Newman/Copyright Office displacement test
Judge Newman dissented in Carol Barnhart in a thorough
opinion that analyzed all of the then-existing conceptual separability
tests.1 19 He examined the previous tests for conceptual separability
in the majority opinion and in Kieselstein-Cord. Judge Newman re-
jected these tests because they misconstrued the word conceptual,
which he defined as occurring "in the 'mind's eye' of the be-
holder."'120 Judge Newman phrased his own conceptual separability
test as follows:
I believe we would be more faithful to the Congressional
scheme if we insisted that a concept, such as that of a work
of art, is "separate" from the concept of an article's utilitar-
ian function only when the non-utilitarian concept can be
entertained in the mind of the ordinary observer without at
the same time contemplating the utilitarian function.
12
This means that Judge Newman would require "temporal displace-
ment" of the aesthetic and utilitarian features of a useful article.12
2
While this test is perhaps truer to the definition of conceptual, it ob-
viously is not a simple task to determine what is in "the mind of the
ordinary observer."
Coincidentally, the Copyright Office issued regulations123 at
about the same time as the Carol Barnhart decision. The Copyright
Office defines conceptual separability as existing when "[t]he artistic
features and the useful article could both exist side by side and be
perceived as fully realized, separate works--one an artistic work and
the other a useful article."' 24 This test is, for all practical purposes,
the same as Judge Newman's temporal displacement test.
Perhaps the biggest criticism of the Judge Newman/Copyright
Office test came from the Carol Barnhart majority, who called it a
119. Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419-24 (Newman, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 423 (Newman, J., dissenting).
122. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 44 (6th ed.
1986).
123. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES (2d ed. 1984).
124. Id. § 505.03, at 500-11.
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"bottomless pit.' 125 The majority criticized the displacement test as
being "a standard so ethereal as to amount to a 'non-test' that would
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to administer or apply."'
126
For example, consider a hammer with a uniquely shaped handle.
One could always imagine the handle as a simple wooden stick; the
artistic part could always appear "in the mind's eye" to be separate.
4. The DenicolalBrandir artistic judgment test
Professor Robert Denicola surveyed the different tests for con-
ceptual separability and concluded that none of the tests truly cap-
tured the purpose of separability-to divide copyrightable art from
uncopyrightable industrial design.' 27  Denicola stated that "[t]he
dominant feature of modem industrial design is the merger of aes-
thetic and utilitarian concerns."' 128 He proposed a sliding scale be-
tween art and utility; the more a work is influenced by utilitarian
considerations, the less it can be copyrighted.
1 29
The Second Circuit adopted Professor Denicola's test in Brandir
International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.130 The opinion,
written by Judge Oakes of Kieselstein-Cord fame, restated the Deni-
cola test:
[I]f design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and func-
tional considerations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot
be said to be conceptually separable from the utilitarian
elements. Conversely, where design elements can be identi-
fied as reflecting the designer's artistic judgment exercised
independently of functional influences, conceptual separa-
bility exists.'
31
125. Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419 n.5.
126. Id.
127. See Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Sug-
gested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 738
(1983).
128. Id. at 739.
129. See id. at 741.
130. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
131. Id. at 1145.
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The Second Circuit then applied the test, finding that the aesthetic
aspects of the bicycle rack were one and the same as the functional
aspects, and found no conceptual separability. 1
32
Two criticisms of the Second Circuit's restatement of the Deni-
cola test are apparent. First, Judge Oakes seemed to require that in-
dustrial design be a result of either "artistic judgment" or "functional
influences"; Professor Denicola looked at the "extent to which the
work reflects artistic expression."' 133  In essence, Professor Deni-
cola's approach was more of a sliding scale, lessening the influence
of functionality and therefore increasing copyrightability with more
artistic influence. 1
34
Second, while the test sounds good, it is itself conceptually dif-
ficult to apply-the test requires judicial analysis of artistic judg-
ment.135 For example, there have been two post-Brandir copyright
cases involving costumes, like those worn during Halloween. In
Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co.,136 the Second Circuit
cited Brandir to find that the artistic and utilitarian functions of
clothing merge, and denied copyright protection. 137  In National
Theme Productions, Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc.,138 however, a district
court in the Ninth Circuit cited the same portion of Brandir as the
Second Circuit, but concluded the opposite-that the function of
costumes has little to do with their design-and granted copyright
protection. 39 The Southern District of California court rested its
132. See id. at 1146-47.
133. Denicola, supra note 127, at 741; see also id. at 746-47.
134. See Perlmutter, supra note 58, at 368.
135. Perhaps that is why at least one appellate court merely recited the
Brandir test and purported to follow it, yet omitted the part about analyzing
artistic judgment. See Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy
Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 494 (4th Cir. 1996).
136. 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989).
137. See id. at 455. To illustrate how the Second Circuit position in Whimsi-
cality does not make sense, in a later case the court held that while "clothes are
not copyrightable[,] .. .[i]n contrast, fabric designs, such as the artwork on
Knitwaves' sweaters, are considered 'writings' for purposes of copyright law
and are accordingly protectible." Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d
996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). In essence, despite Whimsicality,
it seems that clothes are copyrightable in the Second Circuit.
138. 696 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
139. See id. at 1353-54.
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conclusion on a determination that "the Second Circuit improperly
applied the Denicola test . . . [which] will cause decisions to turn
upon 'largely fortuitous circumstances."" 140  Those who desire
protection for works of fashion prefer the National Theme Produc-
tions test, of course, but all industrial designers plead for a more con-
sistent standard to apply.
14'
One further criticism of Brandir is its potentially inconsistent
application. 142 This inconsistency directly stems from the require-
ment that judges decide what the intent of the artist is-how the artist
used artistic judgment. This analysis leads to a wide variation be-
tween judges as to whether a designer had artistic intent or not. Judi-
cial analysis of artistic intent requires judges to "interject their own
subjective standards .... Copyrightability could turn on the per-
sonal experiences of the fact finder. One judge could consider an
idea original while another could consider it commonplace."' 143 Such
judgment of artistic intent, should it be applied without analysis,
would indeed be a danger of the Brandir test.
One judge recently performed a thoughtful analysis using the
Brandir test to analyze another item of industrial design-a watch.
The district court judge in Severin Montres, Ltd. v. Yidah Watch
Co. 144 relied on the National Theme Productions court's interpreta-
tion of Brandir in finding that the plaintiff's wristwatch was copy-
rightable. The plaintiff, the licensee of the Gucci trademark for the
purpose of creating watch designs, 145 created the Gucci G-watch, a
watch with its rectangular frame forming a three-dimensional letter
G.146  The defendants, who made a J-watch and an E-watch,
147
140. Id. at 1353 (quoting Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1151 (Winter, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
141. See Peter K. Schalestock, Comment, Forms of Redress for Design Pi-
racy: How Victims Can Use Existing Copyright Law, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
113, 125-28 (1997).
142. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
143. Lori Petruzzelli, Comment Copyright Problems in Post-Modern Art, 5
DEPAuL J. ART& ENT. L. 115, 138 (1995).
144. 997 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1997). The author of this article was in-
volved as a law clerk for the plaintiffs in this case. The opinions herein are
those of the author only.
145. See id. at 1264 n.1.
146. See id. at 1265.
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claimed that the frame was functional, and could not be protected by
copyright law. 148
According to Judge Wardlaw, "'[w]here design elements can be
identified as reflecting the designer's artistic judgment exercised
independently of functional influences, conceptual separability ex-
ists.,,,149 Judge Wardlaw further found that a watch could be decon-
structed to basic elements of a case, a bezel, a face, and a bracelet,
each of which "may have distinctive features and may be designed in
any number of ways."15  She decided that the plaintiffs artistic ex-
pression contained enough artistic design to be unique and protect-
able under the Brandir test.151 While Judge Wardlaw provided
enough factual basis for her conclusion that the watch design was
"artistic enough," other judges may not be as diligent, leading to
opinions that are hard to review or apply in later cases.
5. The Ninth Circuit's "lack of test" test
Of course, having a confusing test may be better than having no
test at all. The Ninth Circuit seems to have exactly that-no test. In
Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp.,5 2 Fabrica sought copyright protec-
tion for a folder of carpet samples. 153 The Ninth Circuit found that
"no element of the folders ... can be separated out and exist inde-
pendently of their utilitarian aspects." 154 The court did not recite a
specific conceptual separability test or even a case analyzing a test or
concept; the court merely recited the copyright statute and legislative
history without providing further analysis.' 55 By avoiding such an
analysis, the court seemingly avoided having to analyze artistic
judgment. In a way, such an analysis-free test is toothless, for it al-
lows a court to jump to whatever conclusion feels right, given the
facts and circumstances of the case.
147. See id. at 1263.
148. See id. at 1265.
149. Id. (quoting National Theme Productions, 696 F. Supp. at 1353, and
citing Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145).
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983).
153. See id. at 892.
154. Id. at 893.
155. See id. at 893.
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The Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to correct this lack of
analysis recently in Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis
Creative Group, Inc.156  In Entertainment Research Group, the
plaintiff received copyright registration for costumes of such popular
figures as "Toucan Sam" and "Cap'n Crunch."'' 7 The Ninth Circuit,
in analyzing the originality of such costumes, raised the subject of
useful article protection. 5 8 Given these facts, the court could have
easily chosen a conceptual separability test to see if the costumes
warranted protection, or it could have boldly abandoned the doctrine
altogether. But, alas, the court merely cited the statute and Fabrica,
and avoided significant substantive analysis.
159
V. ALTERNATIVE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
A. The Uncertainty of Design Patent Protection
With all of the uncertainty surrounding conceptual separability,
the natural tendency for an industrial designer is to seek other forms
of protection. One possibility is the design patent. 6 ' Obtaining a
design patent does provide the industrial designer with a solid form
of protection. This, however, is not a very good alternative, for sev-
eral reasons.
A design patent is a patent that may be issued only for novel in-
ventions that are also original and ornamental.16 ' Furthermore, a de-
sign patent, like a utility patent, must be nonobvious.162 Nonobvious
means that it must "represent[] a distinct inventive step in advance
of the prior art in the particular field."'163 The nonobviousness
156. 122 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 1997).
157. Id. at 1218.
158. See id. at 1221.
159. See id. The court merely concluded that "in light of § 101 of the Copy-
right Act .... these utilitarian aspects are not copyrightable." Id. The court
did not identify the utilitarian aspects of the costumes. See id.
160. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994).
161. See id. In the context of patent laws, "ornamental" means that the
shape of the invention is not dictated by its function. See Hupp v. Siroflex of
America, Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1460-61 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
162. See 35 U.S.C. § 103.
163. Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1341, 1356 (1987).
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requirement imposes a large financial burden upon the designer, who
must examine a wide array of prior designs to distinguish the inno-
vation. 164 Once the designer spends the money and submits the pat-
ent application, the examiner from the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) rejects the application roughly half of the time.
165
Another problem with design patents is the length of time re-
quired to obtain one. As of 1988, the PTO took an average of two
years to process a design patent after receiving an application. 16 6 By
1995, despite a program to reduce the examination time by half, the
PTO still took an average of eighteen months per application.
167
Often this length of time to obtain a patent is burdensome for the in-
dustrial designer, whose product cycle is much shorter before the de-
sign becomes obsolete.
168
A third major problem with design patents is that even if design-
ers secure patent approval in the PTO, the courts often find design
patents invalid.1 69 The invalidity concern stems from the strict patent
164. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988
U. ILL. L. REv. 887, 894. Dratler observes that "simply filing and prosecuting
the patent application may cost from $2,000 to $5,000, and there may be addi-
tional charges for overcoming the patent examiner's objections." Id.
165. See Thomas B. Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion or
Reality? Twenty Years of Design Patent Litigation Since Compeo v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 10 OKLA. CnTY U. L.
REv. 195, 204-07 (1985).
166. See Dratler, supra note 164, at 893-94.
167. See William T. Fryer, III, Seeking a Benefits Balance in the Industrial
Design Treaty Revision (Hague Agreement): Fifth Meeting of Experts, Held
June 13-16, 1995, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 931, 942-43 (1995).
The PTO accomplished this goal by increasing the number of design patent ex-
aminers from twenty to over fifty. See id. at 943.
168. See Dratler, supra note 164, at 894. Supporting the idea that perhaps
copyright law is more appropriate for industrial design, one commentator has
proposed significantly shortening the length of time between design patent ap-
plication and possible judicial review, based on the copyright law model. See
William T. Fryer, III, Design Patent System for the Twenty-First Century, 24
AIPLA Q.J. 331, 346-47 (1996).
169. See Church, supra note 11, at 501 & nn.11-12. This fact is based on a
study of design patent litigation from 1987-1993. See id. at 501. The Federal
Circuit was created in the fall of 1982 to, among other things, have the power
of review over the federal district courts in patent matters. See id. at 501 n. 11.
Before the Federal Circuit was created, the number of design patents held in-
valid was much higher, up to two-thirds. See id. at 500-01 & n.10; see also
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law requirements for originality; a designer may be able to protect a
slight design variation under copyright standards, but patent law re-
quires that the design not be "obvious" in light of prior designs.'
70
Additionally, once the valid patent is analyzed against a competing
design, courts will find patent infringement only about half of the
time.' 7' The bottom line is that design patents seem to be a long-
shot,172 and often the target ofjudicial hostility.
73
Yet, despite the drawbacks of a design patent, many companies
still opt for this protection and enforce their patents vigorously.
74
Brown, supra note 163, at 1356 (stating that of the thirty percent of design pat-
ents that are held valid, only half will be found to have been infringed).
Much of the concern over design patent invalidity stems from the re-
quirement that the protected product design be ornamental, a description that
conflicts with the concept that form and function are often inseparable. See
Woodring, supra note 17, at 311-12. In fact, one commentator noted that "the
reported cases on... instances when a design patent has been successfully en-
forced can be counted in single digits per year." William S. Thompson, U.S.
Design Protection: Discussion of Status and Suggested Proposals, 24 AIPLA
Q.J. 393, 405 (1996).
170. See 35 U.S.C. § 103.
171. See Brown, supra note 163, at 1356; see also Dan Gallagher, Judge
Frees Qualcomm to Start Manufacture of Its New 'Q' Phone, SAN DIEGO
DAILY TRANSCRIPT, Apr. 25, 1997, at IA (noting that the judge upheld Mo-
torola's cellular phone design patent as valid, but found it not infringed).
172. An eight-to-one longshot, to be exact-one half are issued by the PTO,
half of those are found valid by the courts, and half of those are strong enough
to survive an infringement lawsuit. See supra text accompanying notes 165-
71.
173. See Aoki, supra note 78, at 349; see also In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d
1214, 1217-18 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (ignoring artistic differences between two de-
signs of combination tweezer/spotlight as de minimis, per the court's concep-
tion of the ordinary designer). Some thought that maybe the advent of the
Federal Circuit, see supra note 169, as a replacement for the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals would improve matters for design patentees. See Brown,
supra note 163, at 1356. However, Federal Circuit cases defeat this optimism.
See, e.g., Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234, 240 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (reversing district court's finding that electrical rotary dimmer
switch packaging was ornamental and instead finding design functional). But
see Hupp, 122 F.3d at 1460, 1465 (finding that the mere fact that the article of
manufacture served a function should not adversely affect design patentability,
unless the design itself is functional, yet still finding the valid design patent not
infringed).
174. See, e.g., Lisa Levenson, Oakley Sues Nike over Sunglasses,
OREGONIAN, July 18, 1997, at DI ("Oakley's [sunglasses] technology and in-
novations are protected by more than 300 patents worldwide .... ).
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Perhaps one cause for industrial designers' optimism is the recent
change in copyright policy allowing designers to hold both useful ar-
ticle copyrights and design patents for their designs.
175
Before 1995 the Copyright Office mandated a choice between
protection by copyright and protection by design patent. 17 6 This was
true despite Mazer v. Stein,177 where the Court explicitly found that
the statuette at issue could be protected by both copyright and design
patent, adding that "[w]e do not read such a[n either/or] limitation
into the copyright law."'
178
The Copyright Office ignored Mazer, maintaining that the case
is "inapplicable to the subject of design patents because the statuettes
at issue in Mazer were obviously works of art and not useful works
of industrial design to which only [design] patent protection should
be extended."'179 In support of this rationale, the Copyright Office
cited a 1929 appellate court decision that held that "[a]n inventor
who has applied for and obtained a patent cannot extend his monop-
oly by taking out a copyright."' 80 This policy restricted the industrial
designer, and not all agreed that the policy was sound. For example,
the PTO recognized that copyright law and design patent law com-
plement each other, and allowed both a copyright and a design patent
for a novelty watch depicting Spiro Agnew on its face.1
8 '
The Copyright Office finally saw the error of its ways and re-
vised its regulations in 1995.182 The Office explained as follows:
175. The optimism is appropriate because two longshots are better than one.
176. See David Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein, The Either/Or Protection
Issue, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 19, 1993, at 3.
177. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
178. Id. at218.
179. Goldberg & Bernstein, supra note 176, at 3.
180. Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 36 F.2d 727, 729 (2d Cir.
1929).
181. See In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ("Congress has
not required an author-inventor to elect between the two modes which it has
provided for securing exclusive rights on the type of subject matter here in-
volved. If anything, the concurrent availability of both modes of securing ex-
clusive rights aids in achieving the stated purpose of the constitutional provi-
sion.").
182. See Registrability of Pictorial, Graphic, or Sculptural Works Where a
Design Patent Has Been Issued, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,605, 15,606 (1995) (codified
at 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1995)).
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The Copyright Office regulations... have been criticized.
In his treatise on copyright, Nimmer observes: "[w]ithout
offering the rationale of publication... , Copyright Office
Regulations... simply provided that once a patent has been
issued, copyright registration would be denied to a work of
art. '... There appears to be no statutory or other justifica-
tion for this position. It would seem on principle that if a
work otherwise meets the requirements of copyrightability,
it should not be denied such simply because the claimant
happens to be entitled to supplementary protection under
other legislation." We agree.
83
The new copyright regulation provides that the availability of
design patent protection "will not affect the registrability of a claim
in an original work of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural authorship."' 
8 4
While this change in policy may increase the number of industrial
designs subjected to design patent protection, obtaining a design pat-
ent may be too difficult to achieve to make it worth the industrial de-
signer's efforts, considering the length of time and degree of proof
for validity.1
85
B. The Hostility of Product Configuration Trade Dress Protection
A designer can also seek protection for product configuration
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 186 This section protects a
product's unregistered symbols, otherwise known as its "trade
dress."'187 Trade dress specifically refers to "the total visual image of
a product and the overall impression it creates."'188 Trade dress can
refer to product packaging as well as product configuration.
189
183. Id. (citing DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.19 (1994)) (punctuation altered by Federal Register).
184. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1997).
185. See supra notes 161-73 and accompanying text.
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
187. See Hermenegildo A. Isidro, Note, The Abercrombie Classifications
and Determining the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product Configuration Trade
Dress, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 811, 812 (1996).
188. Id. at 811 (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
764 n.1 (1992)).
189. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. b
(1995).
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While "product packaging" refers to the outer container or label for
the product, "product configuration trade dress" refers to the visual
image inherent in the product itself.190 The advantages of trade dress
include the fact that the protection lasts forever; a patentee can still
prevent competitors from exactly copying the patented product once
the patent term expires. 191 This may explain why manufacturers liti-
gate trade dress infringement cases with increasing frequency to
protect product design features. 1
92
Just as trade dress protection for industrial design is starting to
look attractive, however, critics are becoming openly hostile to trade
dress when applied to product configuration. 9 3  Simultaneously, a
"terrible trio" of circuit cases has discouraged industrial designers
190. See Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1439 (3d
Cir. 1994).
191. See generally Michael S. Pdrez, Note, Reconciling the Patent Act and
the Lanham Act. Should Product Configurations Be Entitled to Trade Dress
Protection After the Expiration of a Utility or Design Patent?, 4 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 383 (1996).
192. See Dinwoodie, supra note 22, at 473-74; see also Lyons Partnership v.
Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947, 949 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (describing how the
creator of Barney, the lovable purple dinosaur, sued the San Diego Chicken for
trade dress infringement); Kathryn Bold, In Search of the Bogus Barney, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at E2 (explaining how Barney, not content with suing
other costumed creatures, is also suing entertainers for trade dress infringement
when they don similar purple dinosaur costumes to please children); David S.
Jackson, Sour Grapes: Kendall-Jackson Is Charging in Court That Gallo
Copied Its Wine-Bottle Design, Thereby Siphoning Sales. The Result: Two
Angry Vintners, Not Much Reserve, TIME, Apr. 7, 1997, at 64 (discussing how
the owner of Kendall-Jackson wine sued the owner of Turning Leaf for trade
dress infringement).
193. See generally Bradley K. Groff, Bare-Fisted Competition or Palming
Off? Protection of Product Design As Trade Dress Under the Lanham Act, 23
AIPLA Q.J. 65 (1995) (suggesting that product design be protected under pat-
ent law as Congress intended, rather than under the Lanham Act); Manotti L.
Jenkins, A Request to the High Court: Don't Let the Patent Laws Be Distracted
by a Flashy Trade Dress, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 323
(1997) (discussing the history of the Patent Act and the Lanham Act and pre-
dicting that the Supreme Court would rule that product designs are covered by
the former and not the latter); Kerrie A. Laba, Note, Have Trade Dress In-
fringement Claims Gone Too Far Under the Lanham Act?, 42 WAYNE L. REV.
1649 (1996) (arguing for a strict definition of trade dress in order to avoid con-
flicts between the patent laws and the Lanham Act).
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from seeking copyright protection, 194 beginning with Versa Products
Co. v. Bifold Co.'95 In Versa Products, the Third Circuit found that
"[w]here product configurations are concerned, we must be espe-
cially wary of undermining competition. Competitors have broad
rights to copy successful product designs when those designs are not
protected by (utility or design) patents."' 196 The Third Circuit deter-
mined to "decide product configuration cases so as to harmonize
them with the federal patent laws."' 197 Based on this perceived con-
flict between trade dress and patent laws, the court went on to drasti-
cally change the test for trade dress infringement in the circuit so as
to make it almost impossible for a product designer to obtain protec-
tion.' 98 For example, the court held that "in a product configuration
case... the greatest weight must be given to the primary means by
which consumers identify the products' sources: packaging, trade-
marks, and advertising."'199 The Versa Products court further found
that "marketing and labeling" were "fundamental in product configu-
ration cases."200 Basically, a company following Versa Products can
copy the packaging or product configuration of another, put on a new
label, and avoid liability.20'
194. The trio consists of Versa Products Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189 (3d
Cir. 1995), Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 1996),
and Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracrafi Corp., 58 F.3d 1498
(10th Cir. 1995). The trio is only "terrible" to those who believe that design
protection is warranted. Others believe that over-protecting design might limit
the alternatives available for consumers, thereby stifling competition and rais-
ing prices. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 193, at 357; Laba, supra note 193, at
1682-83.
195. 50 F.3d 189 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 (1995).
196. Id. at 207.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 208-16. The Third Circuit found that under their new trade
dress product configuration standard, the defendant's offshore oil-drilling rig
valve did not infringe upon the plaintiff's valve patent. See id. at 216.
199. Id. at 209.
200. Id. at 212.
201. See, e.g., Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 520
(M.D. Pa. 1998) (noting that the clearly labeled packaging of peanut butter
M&M's weighed against trade dress infringement of Reese's Pieces packaging
under Versa Products). This "labeling" solution has been criticized as insuffi-
cient in most realistic consumer situations. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Trade Dress
Protection for Product Configurations: Is There a Conflict With Patent Pol-
560
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The Third Circuit's reliance on the "conflict" between trade
dress and patent laws is misplaced. As Judge Richard Posner noted
ten years before the Versa Products decision:
[P]rovided that a defense of functionality is recognized,
there is no conflict with federal patent law, save possibly
with... a design patent. But the courts that have consid-
ered the issue have concluded, rightly in our view, that this
section does not prevent the enforcement of a common law
trademark in a design feature .... [T]here is therefore no
necessary inconsistency between the two modes of protec-
tion.2 °2
Judge Posner recognized that patent law and trade dress law
were both federal laws, created for different purposes. He looked at
those underlying purposes to hold that protection could exist for in-
dustrial designers in the non-functional features of their industrial
designs.
Others hostile toward trade dress rely upon three Supreme Court203 0
cases: 2 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 204 Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. ,205 and Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc.2 0 Reliance on these cases, however, is also misplaced.
The Supreme Court in Sears and Compco held that federal patent and
copyright laws trumped conflicting state unfair competition laws.20 7
Similarly, Bonito Boats found that Florida could not pass a state law
granting patent-like protection for boat hull designs, because federal
patent laws automatically preempted such a law.20 8
icy?, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 427, 574-79 (1996).
202. W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985).
203. While coincidental, these three Supreme Court cases are not the "terri-
ble trio" described at supra note 194 and accompanying text. One commenta-
tor has called Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats a "holy trinity." See Dratler,
supra note 201, at 456.
204. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
205. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
206. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
207. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32; Compco, 376 U.S. at 237-38.
208. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151-52, 167; see also Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus. Inc., 131 F.3d 1011, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (re-
jecting contention that Bonito Boats supported argument that patent law cre-
ated a federal "right to copy," thereby preempting trade dress, and noting that
Bonito Boats' emphasis on the right to exclude others from making, using or
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The Seventh Circuit's Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc.,209 on the other
hand, reflects a more informed view. Kohler involved a dispute be-
tween two competitors over the protection of a faucet design: Moen
had applied for registration of its design as a trademark, and the
Kohler Company opposed. 210 After the Trademark Trial & Appeal
Board dismissed Kohler's opposition, Kohler appealed to a federal
district court under 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) and was again denied.2 1
Upon further appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
Kohler's argument that Sears and Compco provide the basis for
finding a conflict between design patent and trade dress.212 The Sev-
enth Circuit explained that the Compco decision had found
that a defendant may copy at will if the design is "not enti-
tled to a design patent or other federal statutory protection.
." Of course, the Lanham Act falls under the rubric of
"other federal statutory protection," and courts have ex-
pressly held that Sears and Compco do not preclude federal
trademark protection of designs.
213
Kohler then rejects the view that Sears and Compco provide any
support for those who would deny protection to industrial designs.
The support for trade dress in the Seventh Circuit did not last
long, however. Three years later the Seventh Circuit changed its po-
sition in the second case of the terrible trio, Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v.
Fluid-Quip, Inc.,214 a case involving the trade dress protection for the
external design of a "clamshell" corn starch washer.215 The court
stated that "[i]n the case of product configurations [trade dress],...,,216
this broad principle runs headlong into the patent laws. The court
essentially ruled that the federal patent laws preempted the federal
trade dress laws. Although the court noted Kohler, it relied heavily
selling a patented invention did not relate to trade dress law).
209. 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993).
210. See id. at 633.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 640.
213. Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
214. 94 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 1996).
215. Id. at 377-78.
216. Id. at 383.
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on Sears and Versa Products and severely limited trade dress protec-
tion for product configurations in the Seventh Circuit.
2 17
Fortunately for industrial designers, at least one panel of the
Seventh Circuit has again drastically changed that circuit's course
with respect to product configuration trade dress. In Thomas & Betts
Corp. v. Panduit Corp. (Thomas & Betts I),218 the plaintiffs cable
tie patent had expired, and the plaintiff sought to enforce trade dress
protection as an alternative.219 The defendant argued that allowing
such protection is counter to public policy, and the district court
agreed.220 The Seventh Circuit held that "[u]nlike state laws prohib-
iting unfair competition, federal trademark protection cannot be pre-
empted by patent law.",221  After an extensive review of Sears,
Compco, and Bonito Boats, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its hold-
ing in Kohler that '"courts have consistently held that a product's
different qualities can be protected simultaneously, or successively,
by more than one statutory means for protection of intellectual prop-
erty.', 222 According to the court, trade dress protection for industrial
217. See id. at 383-84. The Dorr-Oliver court also cited heavily to Duraco
Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994). See
Dorr-Oliver, 94 F.3d at 383. Duraco Products was the first case to narrowly
construe Two Pesos. See infra note 232. Versa Products cited extensively
from Duraco Products. See Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 198, 203, 207.
218. 138 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3,257 (U.S.
Oct. 13, 1998). This was the second reported decision by the Seventh Circuit
on this same case; the earlier decision denied a preliminary injunction based on
product configuration trade dress, relying extensively on the reasoning of
courts finding a conflict between patent laws and trade dress laws. See Tho-
mas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp. (Thomas & Betts I), 65 F.3d 654, 659-60
(7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996). Given the similarities
between Thomas & Betts I and Dorr-Oliver, the turnabout of the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Thomas & Betts II is surprising.
219. See id. at 282.
220. See id. at 285.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 287-88 (quoting Kohler, 12 F.3d at 638 (citations omitted)). The
Seventh Circuit has seemed to weave between favorable and unfavorable
views towards protection of industrial design, from Kohler to Dorr-Oliver to
Thomas & Betts I, without much explanation as to why prior precedent was
incorrectly decided.
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design is reasonable because of the limitation in trademark law that
functional features cannot be protected.223
The third case of the terrible trio is Vornado Air Circulation
Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp.224 Vornado involved the trade dress
of a household fan grill design.2 5 Vomado had received a utility
patent for the aerodynamic qualities of the fan.226 However, it did
not seek to enforce their patent against Duracraft; instead it decided
to enforce the product configuration trade dress of the fan.227 The
Vornado court started its decision on the wrong foot, declaring that
[t]his case presents an issue of first impression in our circuit
concerning the intersection of the Patent Act and the Lan-
ham Trademark Act. We must decide whether a product
configuration is entitled to trade dress protection when it
has been a significant inventive component of an invention
covered by a utility patent.
228
Of course, the Vornado court did find a conflict between the
patent and trademark laws and denied trade dress protection for Vor-
nado's fan grill industrial design.229  The court relied heavily on
Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats, a consistent theme among the ter-
rible trio.
230
223. See id. at 288-89.
224. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996).
225. See id. at 1500.
226. See id.
227. See id. at 1501. Vornado agreed that its utility patent was not infringed
by Duracraft's product. See id.
228. Id. at 1499.
229. See id. at 1510. In making its decision, the Tenth Circuit seemed to
preempt one federal law, the Lanham Act, with another federal law, the Patent
Act. For a good criticism of this preemption, see Ruby Ann David, Comment,
Federal Preemption of a Federal Statute: The Case of Vornado Air Circulation
Systems v. Duracraft Corporation, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 253 (1996). The
Federal Circuit, the appellate court with jurisdiction to hear all appeals in pat-
ent cases, see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994), has also criticized such preemption
or suggestion that the federal patent laws create any affirmative rights, such as
the right to copy. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d
1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Leatherman Tool Group, 131 F.3d at
1014-15 (stating that the "right to copy" is not an affirmative right created by
the federal patent laws, but is instead a common law right).
230. See Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1503-05. Professor Dratler has found the Vor-
nado preemption analysis to be flawed, although he did opine that the result of
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With decisions like Vornado, it is time for the Supreme Court to
either justify or negate the hostility.231 For now, judicial views of
trade dress are too hostile for trade dress to be an attractive alterna-
tive to either the confusion of conceptual separability or the uncer-
tainty of design patent protection. 32
VI. THE ARCHITECTURAL WORKS COPYRIGHT PROTECTION ACT OF
1990 233-A BEACON?
Given the failure of current patent, trademark, and copyright law
to provide consistent protection for industrial design,234 the United
States should modify its laws to comply with the requirements of
TRIPs, notwithstanding the assurances of President Clinton.
235
Vornado may be correct due to a real limit on the design alternatives available
to competitors. See Dratler, supra note 201, at 538-39.
231. As of October 1998, the Supreme Court had received at least seven pe-
titions for certiorari from product design trade dress cases in an eighteen month
span and denied them all. See Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138
F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3,257 (Oct. 13, 1998);
Sunbeam Prods. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1795 (1998); Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663
(8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1085 (1997); Thomas & Betts Corp. v.
Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996);
Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996); Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens,
Inc., 53 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir.) (applying Second Circuit trade dress substantive
law), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 909 (1995); Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50
F.3d 189 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 (1995).
232. This hostility appears to be primarily directed at product configuration
trade dress for now. This is in part due to an interpretation of Two Pesos, Inc.
v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), holding that the Supreme Court
decision only applies to packaging trade dress and not product configuration
trade dress. See, e.g., Duraco Prods., 40 F.3d at 1442 (distinguishing Two Pe-
sos as a packaging trade dress case and not a product configuration case be-
cause restaurant decor is akin to packaging). But see Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad
Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 787-88 (8th Cir. 1995) (criticizing and declining to follow
Duraco Prods. and its "new test for ... trade dress comprising product features
or shape as opposed to packaging"); Lainer v. Bandwagon, Inc., 983 F. Supp.
292, 300 (D. Mass. 1997) (following the Stuart Hall approach for expansive
trade dress protection).
233. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5133 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102,
120 (1994)).
234. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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TRIPs requires that "[m]embers shall give effect to the provisions of
this Agreement. ' 23 6 It further dictates that "[m]embers shall provide
for the protection of independently created industrial designs that are
new or original. 237 TRIPs also makes clear that, in providing in-
dustrial design protection, a member country may determine that
such protection should not extend to "technical or functional consid-
erations. 2 38 One way to modify United States intellectual property
law to comply with TRIPs is to create a separate, independent body
of intellectual property law, also known as a sui generis industrial
design law.239 Another possibility is to modify existing architectural
copyright law to include industrial design within its domain of pro-
tection.
Industrial design, like architecture, benefits society when its
functional underlying works are at the same time artistic and aes-
thetically pleasing to behold. Therefore, it is only appropriate to
consider the changes made to strengthen copyright protection for ar-
chitecture as potentially applicable to industrial design. Before de-
ciding whether the current architecture laws are sufficient, however,
it is informative to first examine the way architecture was treated be-
fore Congress changed the copyright laws.
A. The History ofArchitecture Copyright Protection
Prior to 1990, an architectural work was treated as a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5), because ar-
chitecture was considered to be a form of large-scale sculpture. 40
As such, architecture was a useful article, for it certainly had a utili-
tarian function-that of housing people or businesses. -24' Being a
useful article brought architecture under the conceptual separability
test, and, "given the difficulty of separating a building's utilitarian
236. TRIPs art. 1, § 1 (emphasis added).
237. Id. art. 25, § 1 (emphasis added).
238. Id.
239. See generally infra Part VII.B.
240. See Gregory B. Hancks, Comment, Copyright Protection for Architec-
tural Design: A Conceptual and Practical Criticism, 71 WASH. L. REV. 177,
179 (1996).
241. See Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 663 n.7 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) ("A 'useful article' ... necessarily includes living quarters.").
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aspects from its design, the copyright law generally denied architects
any protection for constructed architectural works." 242 The concep-
tual separability test does not apply to non-useful articles, so archi-
tectural works that were purely ornamental still received protec-
tion.243
The lack of protection for architectural works in general did not,
however, include the copyrighting of architectural plans.2 4  This
distinction provided that a copyist could not copy plans in order to
duplicate a building, but could meticulously study the building itself
to create a copy.245 This architectural plan-building distinction was
so strong that it became a sort of maxim that allowed judges to avoid
discussing separability at all when the copyrightability of architec-
tural structures was at issue.
246
This treatment of architectural structures was inconsistent with
the goal of copyright-to encourage and protect creativity in original
works. 47 What early treatment of architecture ignored was its role
as an art form, both romantic and innovative; instead, architecture
was viewed as a science, merely rational and imitative. 248 How can a
242. Clark T. Thiel, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Gesture
of 1990, Or, "Hey, That Looks Like My Building!", 7 DEPAUL J. ART & ENT.
L. 1, 10 (1996); see also Gemcraft Homes, Inc. v. Sumurdy, 688 F. Supp. 289,
295 n.12 (E.D. Tex. 1988) ("[T]he building is not within the subject matter of
copyright.").
243. This protection would mainly include embellishments such as gargoyles
and friezes. See, e.g., Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421
F.2d 279, 280-82 (5th Cir. 1970) (ignoring separability discussion for archi-
tectural work that is purely a "work of art").
244. See Eales v. Environmental Lifestyles, Inc., 958 F.2d 876, 879-80 (9th
Cir. 1992).
245. This distinction was often very confusing. See, e.g., Herman Frankel
Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (E.D. Mich. 1973) ("A person can-
not, by copyrighting plans, prevent the building of a house similar to that
taught by the copyrighted plans.... A person should, however, be able to pre-
vent another from copying copyrighted house-plans and using them to build
the house.").
246. See, e.g., Schuchart & Assocs., Prof'l Eng'rs, Inc. v. Solo Serve Corp.,
540 F. Supp. 928, 941 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (ignoring 1976 Act and summarily
rejecting protection for "the structure depicted in the [architectural] draw-
ings").
247. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991) ("The sine qua non of copyright is originality.").
248. See Raleigh W. Newsam, II, Architecture and Copyright-Separating
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work of architecture not also be a work of art when it is described as
being able to "elevate the soul?"249  When architecture can truly
transform a city to the point where critics proclaim that the city does
not deserve such beautiful architecture, 250 it has risen to a level
deserving protection beyond that provided by conceptual separabil-
ity. Of course, an "elevate the soul" standard would provide little
protection; the law should, and does, aim its test a little lower.
B. Congress Changes The Architecture Copyright Law
When Congress changed the architecture copyright laws in
1990, it did not do so in response to criticism that architecture de-
served protection as art. Instead, it changed the law in response to
international pressure to comply with the Berne Convention.2 51 As
early as 1976, when overhauling the copyright laws, the United
States wanted to move towards Berne Convention compliance.
252
However, since the Berne Convention required "that member nations
extend full copyright protection to architectural works," Congress
asked the Copyright Office for recommendations.
253
the Poetic from the Prosaic, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1073, 1076 (1997); see also ADA
LOUISE HUXTABLE, ARCHITECTURE ANYONE? 45-46 (1986) ("[An architect]
mak[es] poetry out of visual devices, as a writer uses literary or aural devices.
As words become symbols, so do objects; the architectural world is an endless
source of symbols with unique ramifications in time and space.").
249. Nicolai Ouroussoff, A Modern Sanctuary, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1997,
at Fl. Ouroussoff analyzed architect Jos6 Rafael Moneo's plans for the new
$50-million Roman Catholic Archdiocese cathedral for Los Angeles. See id.
Moneo's architectural goals, he said, included "provid[ing] an antidote for a
world he perceives as increasingly spiritually empty." Id.
250. David Geffen, in an early tour of the new Getty Center museum, pro-
claimed that the museum was "too good for Los Angeles." Kurt Andersen, A
City on a Hill, THENEw YORKER, Sept. 29, 1997, at 66, 66.
251. See Thiel, supra note 242, at 17-18. The Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works has been the major international
copyright law for the last 100 years. See Hancks, supra note 240, at 181 &
n.33. The United States finally agreed to join the Berne Convention in 1988,
primarily to enjoy the benefit of more stringent enforcement and remedies for
violations of American copyright overseas. See Dawn M. Larsen, Comment,
The Effect of the Berne Implementation Act of 1988 on Copyright Protection
for Architectural Structures, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 151, 157-58.
252. See Hancks, supra note 240, at 181-82 & n.33 (quoting S. REP. NO.
100-352, at 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3707).
253. Thiel, supra note 242, at 18.
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As a result of these recommendations, Congress made signifi-
cant changes to the protection of architecture within copyright law.
2 5 4
Architecture is now protected in a category separate from pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works. 5 It is subject to the same rights and
limitations as other copyrighted works, with some exceptions.256 To
protect an architectural work, a plaintiff still must prove that the in-
fringer had access to the plaintiffs work and that the infringer's
work was substantially similar.257 Access and substantial similarity
are tests that can be quite hard to interpret.
258
The advantage of the new law is that an architectural work is no
longer considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work.2 5 9  As
such, architecture does not have to be analyzed under the useful arti-
cle or conceptual separability tests. 260 The new law transported ar-
chitecture copyright law from "intellectual property limbo" to a law
254. See generally Leicester v. Warner Bros., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1501, 1506-07
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (discussing extensive changes to architectural copyright laws
as a result of the need to comply with the Beme Convention).
255. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (1994).
256. Since architectural works are visible from a public place, Congress
carved out a fair use exception that permits the unauthorized "making, distrib-
uting, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial
representations of the work." 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (1994). The copyright law is
also concerned that "individual standard features," such as doors and windows,
be in the public domain. See id. § 101. The legislative history interpreted the
definition of "architectural work" to exclude elements that were "functionally
required." See infra note 264 and accompanying text. The fact that Congress
retained limitations on the new law is important because the limitations main-
tained a balance between protection and competition.
257. See, e.g., J.R. Lazaro Builders, Inc. v. R.E. Ripberger Builders, Inc.,
883 F. Supp. 336, 342-44 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (interpreting the new act and noting
the difficulty in assessing the designer's creativity in the context of an ordinary
residence).
258. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1398 (9th Cir.) (describing the Ninth Circuit substantial similarity test as being
in a twenty year state of evolution), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997).
259. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (1994).
260. See id. § 101 (definition of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work is the
only part of the copyright statute that refers to useful articles or conceptual
separability); see also Richmond Homes Management, Inc. v. Raintree, Inc.,
862 F. Supp. 1517, 1525 (W.D. Va. 1994) ("[A]rchitectural works need no
longer serve primarily nonfunctional, creative purposes, akin to sculptures...
."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 66 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 1995)
(unpublished table decision).
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where "structures, as well as plans, are subject to the same copyright
protection."
26'
One motivation for creating a separate category for architecture,
in addition to Berne Convention compliance, was to avoid concep-
tual separability. The House Report describing the 1990 Act de-
clared that
the copyrightability of architectural works shall not be
evaluated under the separability test applicable to pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works embodied in useful articles.
There is considerable scholarly and judicial disagreement
over how to apply the separability test, and the principal
reason for not treating architectural works as pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works is to avoid entangling archi-
tectural works in this disagreement.
262
Legislators knew that the conceptual separability test was diffi-
cult to apply, and deleted it from the architecture test.
Congress, however, knew it needed some limitation to the pro-
tection for architectural works.. Although legislative history con-
tained a two-step test, Congress did not include the test in the text of
the statute itself.263  The two-step test included first determining
whether the architectural work contained original design elements,
and then determining if the work "functionally require[s]" the design
elements.2 64 Adding a functionality test could confuse some judges
who misapply the test; a judge might not notice that the law no
longer requires dissection of works to determine which parts are
functional and which are decorative. 265 Congress may have realized
the potential for confusion, for it further explained that "[e]vidence
that there is more than one method of obtaining a given functional
261. Richmond Homes, 862 F. Supp. at 1524-25; see also JR. Lazaro Build-
ers, 883 F. Supp. at 339 ("Therefore, copyright protection is extended to...
the house itself.").
262. H.R. REP. No. 101-735, at 20 (1990) (citing Perlmutter, supra note 58),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 20-21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951-52. There
has not been any judicial construction of the "functional requirement" lan-
guage.
265. The key concept involved in the architecture analysis is that works can
be functional and aesthetic yet still be protected.
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result may be considered in evaluating registrability or the scope of
protection."266 Presumably, the more ways there are to design a
structure to obtain its desired functional result, the broader the pro-
tection will be for the architect. In any event, the courts would, upon
challenge to the copyrightability of the work, "be free to decide the
issue upon the facts presented, free of the separability conundrum
presented by the useful articles doctrine."
267
VII. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING INDUSTRIAL DESIGN LAW
A. Applicability to Industrial Design
In an effort to achieve the intellectual property balance,268 Con-
gress should act to expand the architectural protection to all useful
articles, thereby eliminating the conceptual separability test. Other
countries provide,269 or are planning to provide, specific protection
for industrial design.270 The policy behind the Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act of 1990 easily applies to industrial design,
as industrial design protection also serves important social pur-
poses,271 distinguishing products and promoting creativity and art.272
266. Id. at 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6952.
267. Id.
268. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., JOON KOO LEE & PARTNERS, THE 1990 REVISION OF THE
KOREAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAW (COMPARED WITH THE PREVIOUS LAW)
186 (1990) (noting that Article 2(1) of the Korean law protects "the shape,
pattern, color or combination thereof in an article which produces an aesthetic
visual impression.").
270. See Hugh C. Hansen, The Harmonization of Trademark, Copyright and
Design Law in the European Community, in GLOBAL TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT 1995: MANAGEMENT AND PROTECTION 173, 198 (Practising Law
Institute ed., 1995). The European Community proposal looked remarkably
similar to the new United States architectural protection in that "[n]o distinc-
tion is made between aesthetic and functional designs, however features neces-
sary to achieve a technical function and which leave no freedom as regards ar-
bitrary elements are unprotectable in order not to monopolize technical
functions by way of design protection." Id.
271. One industrial designer has commented about design and its relation-
ship to society as follows:
The history of the world can be documented by the design of objects
and the study of these objects gives a clear message about the changes
that were taking place in society. Indeed, it is reasonable to conclude
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The impact of such a change in United States copyright laws
would be a death knell for conceptual separability, thereby saving
judicial resources from being wasted in constantly interpreting this
confusing concept. Designers would be entitled to protection for
their functional and artistic works; this added protection would un-
doubtedly spur creativity, thereby "promot[ing] the [p]rogress of...
[the] useful [a]rts. 273 Perhaps this new industrial design law would
contain a further advantage by requiring modem-day knock-off art-
ists to resort to their own creative skills rather than absconding with
those of others.
274
The extension of greater protection for industrial design is also
consistent with the goals of the former Congressional Act that pro-
posed design protection, Title II of the 1976 Copyright Act.275 In
passing the 1976 Act, Congress stated that deleting Title II design
protection required new committee consideration of that legisla-
tion.276 In deleting Title II, Congress particularly expressed concerns
that in many instances, especially in the 20th century, it is the very de-
sign and innovation of products that induced change in society.
Conran, supra note 1, at 8.
272. Many would argue that architecture embodies a higher form of creativ-
ity than does industrial design. Architects, like those who built the Getty Cen-
ter in Los Angeles, work on a much grander scale, creating visible works with
real societal impact. The typical industrial designer, such as a watch designer,
exposes his or her creation to only a relatively small portion of society. In
spite of these dissimilarities, the industrial designer is still creating a work of
art, and spends a significant amount of creative effort making a unique prod-
uct. See Hancock, supra note 7, at 272-75; see also Reichman, supra note 10,
at 2459-60 (noting that smaller-sized companies often attempt to overcome a
smaller market share by improving the appearance of their products). The fact
that the architect works on an even grander scale, spending more time and
money than the typical industrial designer, is really quite irrelevant in copy-
right law. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
349 (1991) ("The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of
authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."' (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
273. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
274. But see H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 50 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5663 (rejecting proposed design copyright law due to as-
sertion by the Justice Department of anticompetitive effect). Since the United
States is now more aligned with international copyright law as part of the
Berne Convention, perhaps it is time to revisit Title II.
275. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
276. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 50, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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with creating new monopolies. 2 " However, by following the advice
of the congressional committee that passed the Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act of 1990,278 and the similar advice of other
Berne Convention nations, 279 Congress could institute a workable
copyright law to protect industrial design.
Furthermore, it makes sense from an economic point of view to
enhance protection for industrial designers. When courts deem
original designs unprotectable, common sense dictates that manu-
facturers will pay less for the opportunity to use such designs to dis-
tinguish their products. This discourages, rather than encourages, the
artist or author and clearly contradicts copyright's goal of spurring
creativity.280 Consumers suffer economically, too. Without original,
artistic designs with strong intellectual property protection, products
become harder to distinguish. A consumer may become confused
and purchase a lower quality product that lasts fewer years than the
product the consumer had intended to buy.281 While this "likelihood
of confusion' standard is traditionally the hallmark of trade-
mark/trade dress law,282 upholding design protection through strong
copyright legislation would fulfill the goal of eliminating consumer
confusion without the hostility that is directed towards the unlimited
nature of trade dress law.283 Such an industrial design law might
achieve the desired balance between allowing protection while not
over-burdening competition, a balance that may have allowed the en-
actment of Title II had Congress discovered it.
5659, 5663.
277. See id. The House Report noted the Justice Department's concern that
the benefits of increased design protection had not been shown to "outweigh
the disadvantage of removing such designs from free public use." Id.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 263-67.
279. See supra note 270.
280. See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF
COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 2 (1991).
281. See United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 1987)
("[Harm occurs] when potential purchasers . . . see unauthentic goods and
identify these goods with the trademark holder.").
282. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994); see also AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats,
599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979) (outlining factors for likelihood of confusion
test); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)
(same).
283. See supra Part V.B.
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Since the life of a product is often short, perhaps industrial de-
sign protection does not need the same duration as other copyrighted
works, which receive protection for the life of the author plus an ad-
ditional seventy years.284 Critics might argue that such a long dura-
tion would have adverse effects on the free market, and exhaust
product differentiation choices. As a response, Congress could
shorten the protection period for industrial design. Congress could
also consider incorporating much of the same fair use limitations
seen for architectural works.285 However, these additional limita-
tions may not be needed for industrial design. For example, once a
product is sold containing an industrial design, the first sale doctrine
of copyright law allows purchasers to resell286 the product or display
it.287 Creators of architectural works receive limited rights to prevent
the destruction of works; these rights are based on the premise that
architecture is typically stationary.28 8 Industrial design would not
need these extra rights and limitations.
Perhaps the only protection industrial designers really need is
the right to prevent reproduction 89 and unauthorized derivative
works.290 These limitations may be necessary to perfect the balance
sought between the conflicting goals of copyright-protecting both
the natural rights of artists and the public benefit. '91 Even with
limitations, the proposed changes to copyright laws to benefit indus-
trial design are consistent with constitutional guidelines and would
provide benefits that outweigh potential monopolistic concerns.
Constitutionally, the useful arts benefit from legal protection for the
284. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1998 Supp.). But note that some products ar-
guably will reach the life-plus-seventy duration, such as the Coke bottle. See
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
285. The limitations include the right to make, distribute or display publicly
any pictures, paintings, or photographic representations of any work visible
from a public place. See 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (1994).
286. See id. § 109(a).
287. See id. § 109(c).
288. See id. § 120(b).
289. See id. § 106(1).
290. See id. § 106(2).
291. See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 280, at 2. Arguably, the pub-
lic benefit may be served by fewer restrictions on protection. See supra text
accompanying note 281.
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works of authors; such protection promotes innovation, ultimately
allowing consumers to benefit from the increasing number of choices
of products.
B. Alternative Protection: Sui Generis Design Law
Both within current United States intellectual property law, as
well as the laws of other countries, sui generis protection exists. Sui
generis protection is often more appropriate than standard copyright
law when similar laws in existence provide protection inconsistent
with the legislative goals of protection for the product.292
For example, in 1984 Congress passed a law aimed at providing
protection for semiconductor design, "mask works., 293  The semi-
conductor industry was concerned with protecting mask works-the
surface images of integrated circuit designs contained in semicon-
ductor chips-from blatant copying.2 94 By passing a sui generis law,
Congress was able to provide a shorter period of protection, ten
years, for the mask works, 95 as opposed to the typical term of pro-
tection for most copyright works, which is equal to the life of the
author plus seventy years.296 Presumably to allow for the fast-paced
nature of the semiconductor industry, Congress also built a two-year
grace period for mask work registration into the sui generis law.
297
Industrial design is an appropriate candidate for sui generis
protection. Indeed, several countries already protect industrial de-
sign in this fashion.298 For example, the French government at-
tempted similar sui generis protection for computer software. 99
292. See generally H.R. REP. No. 98-781, at 5-11 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5750, 5754-60 (comparing sui generis law to copyright law and
concluding that sui generis law is more appropriate for semiconductor mask
works, given the balance Congress desired to achieve).
293. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98
Stat. 3347 (1984) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1994)).
294. See Reichman, supra note 10, at 2478-79.
295. See 17 U.S.C. § 904 (1994).
296. See id. § 302(a) (1998 Supp.).
297. See id. § 908(a) (1994).
298. See supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text; see also Reichman, su-
pra note 10, at 2488-90 (discussing sui generis protection in Britain and France
for industrial design, otherwise known as "applied art").
299. See Reichman, supra note 10, at 2481-83.
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The United States recently considered a sui generis industrial
design law. On October 12, 1998, the United States House of Repre-
sentatives passed a bill that included a section establishing a sui
generis law for a specific subcategory of industrial design.3§0 The
overall bill, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 0 1 con-
tains as a part of it the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act
(VHDPA).3 °1 The bill was a result of a compromise reached after
the Senate had originally deleted the VHDPA from the DMCA.30 3
The VHDPA amends Title 17 of thp United States Code to add
Sections 1301-1332.3o4 At first glance, the new act looks promising
to industrial designers, as it provides that "[t]he designer or other
owner of an original design of a useful article which makes the arti-
cle attractive or distinctive in appearance to the purchasing or using
public may secure the protection provided by this chapter upon com-
plying with and subject to this chapter."30 5 A closer examination,
however, reveals that the act defines the term "useful article" nar-
rowly as only "a vessel hull, including a plug or mold. 30 6
Sui generis protection for vessel hulls, ironically, is a reaction to
the Supreme Court decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc.30 7 Bonito Boats dealt with federal preemption of state
law; nothing in the case precluded a vessel hull designer from seek-
ing useful article copyright protection or even trade dress protec-
tion.30 8 The reasoning for the VHDPA is unknown; "[t]he record of
the floor discussion of H.R. 2281 in the House is entirely silent on
the purposes of the title."
30 9
300. See 144 CONG. REc. H10,621 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998).
301. H.R. 2281, reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. H10,048-64 (daily ed. Oct. 8,
1998).
302. H.R. 2281, tit. V, reprinted in 144 CONG. REc. H10,060-64 (daily ed.
Oct. 8, 1998).
303. See 144 CONG. REc. S10,537 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1998) (motion of Sen.
Santorum).
304. See VHDPA § 502.
305. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1)).
306. Id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(2)).
307. 489 U.S. 141 (1989). See supra text accompanying notes 203-08.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 209-13.
309. Letter from Peter Jaszi of the Digital Future Coalition to Pat Roberts,
United States Senator 2 (Aug. 24, 1998) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review) [hereinafter Digital Future Coalition Letter].
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Critics have observed that the VHDPA could "easily be ex-
panded" to cover industrial design, including "automobile body and
part designs, furniture designs, and clothing designs."31 The critics'
concerns seem to be misplaced. It is true that the VHDPA fulfills the
goal of providing protection for industrial design, that of giving
rights to valuable intellectual property.31' On the other hand, the
VHDPA limits the time for protection to ten years,312 which may be
sufficient for copyright-like protection in a field with rapid product
design turnover without providing too large a monopoly. Further-
more, the VHDPA contains additional safeguards, including an
originality requirement3 13 and denying protection merely for ftmc-
tionality.' 14 These critics maintain that expanding the VHDPA to
other industrial design would cause an "extraneous controversy,"
315
and "would represent the 'opening wedge' for a potentially far-
reaching reconceptualization of American intellectual property
law."316 However, these VHDPA critics were actually speaking as
DMCA advocates; they seemed more concerned that Congress
passed the VHDPA as a hidden component of the larger DMCA,
which had an entirely different purpose, protecting copyright in the
digital envrionment.
317
Other critics include the Senators debating the actual bill. For
example, Senator Strom Thurmond indicated concern that the new
310. Id.
311. See VHDPA § 502 (proposing 17 U.S.C. §§ 1308-1309).
312. See id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1305(a)).
313. See id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1302(1)).
314. See id. (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1302(4)). Protection would be denied to
a design that is "dictated solely by a utilitarian function of the article that em-
bodies it." Id.
315. Digital Future Coalition Letter, supra note 309, at 3.
316. Id. at2-3.
317. Surprisingly, after making such strong statements, the Digital Future
Coalition declared that it "takes no position on the merits of the design protec-
tion issue." Id. at 3. Apparently, the true concern of the Coalition was that the
issue was "wholly unrelated to intellectual property rights in the digital envi-
ronment," which was the subject matter of the substantive legislation that the
Coalition had supported and which provided the original purpose of the
DMCA. See id. at 3. The VHDPA was but one section of the DMCA, at-
tached to it at the very end, and does not seem to relate to the DMCA's other
subject matter in any way.
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bill would protect "functionality... in addition to aesthetic aspects.
It is my understanding that functionality is protected from copying
through patent [law]. '' 3  This "understanding" of Senator Thurmond
is the same flawed logic that has led appellate courts to deny trade
dress protection to product configurations associated with an expired
utility patent.31 9
Senator Orrin Hatch, however, supported the idea of a sui gene-
ris intellectual property law for industrial desi in general, but
noted how controversial such a law would be. 3F In light of this
controversy, Senator Hatch devised a special provision to achieve the
desired intellectual property balance. 321 The provision Senator Hatch
referred to is a sunset provision-after two years, the VHDPA ex-
pires, and the heads of the Patent & Trademark Office and the Copy-
right Office must meet to create a joint report evaluating the effect of
the VHDPA.322 The renewal criteria that Senator Hatch selected are
interesting-the VHDPA directs the head of the two offices to con-
sider:
(1) the extent to which the amendments made by this title
has been effective in suppressing infringement of the design
of vessel hulls;
(2) the extent to which the registration provided for in
chapter 13 of title 17, United States Code, as added by this
title, has been utilized;
(3) the extent to which the creation of new designs of ves-
sel hulls have been encouraged by the amendments made by
this title;
(4) the effect, if any, of the amendments made by this title
on the price of vessels with hulls protected under such
amendments; and
318. 144 CONG. REc. S1 1,889 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond).
319. See supra notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
320. See 144 CONG. REC. S11,889 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
321. See id.
322. See VHDPA § 504(a).
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(5) such other considerations as... may [be] relevant to ac-
complish the purposes of the evaluation conducted under
subsection (a).323
This direction is actually a balance, looking at the inspiration the
intellectual property regime provides to stimulate creation of boat
hull designs, and contrasting that inspiration against barriers such as
increased prices for consumers.
In essence, these criteria, selected "to help us make the right de-
cision,' ' 324 perform the exact balancing needed to optimize a new re-
gime of intellectual property protection by comparing the incentives
to designers with the effect on competition and access. Even though
the VHDPA only applies to boat hull designs, it will be interesting to
see what results from the two-year experiment of the new act.
325
The reformulated VHDPA seems to be well-suited to the princi-
ples underlying a much-needed industrial design law. Such a law
would certainly comply with TRIPs both in letter and spirit. If the
joint study of the VIDPA shows that a balance between improved
industrial design protection and access to prior works has been
achieved for boat hulls, it would be appropriate to expand the
VHDPA with a simple amendment to cover all industrial design.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It has been over a century since the Industrial Revolution, when
industry began producing designs in mass quantities to attract con-
sumers. After all this time, intellectual property protection for
industrial design is still far from certain. Despite President Clinton's
assurances that current copyright and patent laws properly protect
industrial design,326 protection today is difficult to achieve.
323. Id. § 504(b).
324. 144 CONG. REC. Si1,889 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
325. The joint study will take place by November, 2000, since on October
28, 1998, President Clinton signed H.R. 2281, the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act, into law. See White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement
by the President Signing H.R. 2281 Into Law (Oct. 28, 1998), available in
White House, Search All White House Publications (visited Nov. 2, 1998)
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/search/everything.html> (word search of "all
documents" posted after Oct. 20, 1998, for key word "copyright").
326. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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Copyright protection for industrial design is riddled with confusion.
If a court determines that the design to be protected is useful, it must
pass any one of a number of conceptual separability tests, each with
its own supporters and critics. The familiar cry of infringers--"pro-
tect it with a design patent"--is often no use, given the extremely
short product cycle for industrial design combined with the uncer-
tainty of a designer's ability to enforce a valid design patent. Turn-
ing to trade dress protection under the Lanham Act is also becoming
increasingly futile. This is due in large part to possibly misplaced
academic and judicial hostility towards product configuration trade
dress.
A solution to the industrial design protection problem already
exists. The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990
recognized the importance of protection and provided a simple test to
protect previously unprotected architectural structures. This change
brought architectural copyright laws into synchronization with inter-
national protection, yet provided a functionality restriction and only
limited guidance on how to apply the limitation.
To the extent that copyright law provides too much protection
for industrial design, -3 2 7 sui generis design protection under Title 17
of the United States Code presents another solution. Sui generis
protection would provide the same validity and infringement tests as
the proposed industrial design copyright law, but for a much shorter
duration and with fewer rights than architecture now receives. Copy-
right law already successfully protects certain works with sui generis
protection; for instance, the House of Representatives recently
passed a law that would provide industrial design protection for boat
hulls. There is no reason why such a stand-alone law could not suc-
cessfully protect industrial design in general.
It may be true that the guidance Congress provided in the con-
text of the architecture copyright law or the sui generis vessel boat
hull design law is insufficient and that courts will have as difficult a
time with the concept of functionality under those laws as they do
with conceptual separability. But even so, it is time to bring domes-
tic industrial design protection in line with international protection,
and to finally address the deletion of Title II from the 1976
327. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
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Copyright Act. Either a change in the copyright law, or the addition
of sui generis design protection, would remove the advantage to in-
fringers, and redeliver a free market to the real artists who deserve to
capitalize on their efforts. The architectural standard is the beacon
for Congress to find its way out of the conceptual separability dark-
ness. The proposed tests may not be the perfect solution. They are
solutions, however, which avoid confusion, uncertainty, and hostil-
ity. These solutions are exactly what industrial design deserves.
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